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Frazier and Larson: When the Rule Invites the Exceptions

WHEN THE RULE INVITES THE EXCEPTIONS:
HOW THE ARIZONA SUPREME COURT’S ATTEMPT TO CLARIFY THE ECONOMIC
LOSS RULE IN FLAGSTAFF AFFORDABLE HOUSING HAS LED TO DISCONTINUITY
IN SUBSEQUENT APPLICATION
Grant H. Frazier* & Justin J. Larson**
I.

INTRODUCTION

The economic loss rule (“ELR”) is “a common law rule limiting a
contracting party to contractual remedies for recovery of economic losses
unaccompanied by physical injury to person or other property” not included in the
contract.1 The policy behind the ELR “is to encourage private ordering of economic
relationships and to uphold the expectations of the parties by limiting a plaintiff to
contractual remedies for loss of benefit of the bargain.”2 Application of the ELR
depends “on context-specific policy considerations” including the competing
policies underlying contract and tort law.3
In recent years, several Arizona state courts have impermissibly expanded
the scope of the ELR beyond the limits set by the Arizona Supreme Court in the
seminal ELR case Flagstaff Affordable Housing Limited Partnership v. Design
Alliance, Inc.4 This is not to say that the Arizona trial and appellate courts are at
fault. Rather, the Arizona Supreme Court’s imprecise opinion in Flagstaff
Affordable Housing has injected unnecessary ambiguity into a complicated area of
state law—particularly with regard to professional negligence claims against
architects.
This Article contends that the decision in Flagstaff Affordable Housing
should not be construed to turn the ELR into a complete bar to tort claims against
architects, but rather should consider context-specific policy considerations before
applying the ELR.5
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1
Flagstaff Affordable Hous. Ltd. P’ship v. Design All., Inc., 223 P.3d 664, 667 (Ariz.
2010).
2
Id. at 671.
3
Id. at 669.
4
See generally id.
5
Id. at 669.
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II.

THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE GENERALLY

The ELR holds that a party with contract remedies who suffers only monetary
injury due to another’s conduct cannot recover those losses in tort.6 The rationale is
that tort theories should not be used to pursue damages based on nothing more than
a breach of contract.7 Arizona’s courts disallow tort claims under these
circumstances because permitting them would subsume contract claims into a “sea
of tort.”8 Contract law, which is concerned with the individual arrangement and risk
allocation between contracting parties, is the proper method for evaluating these
claims, rather than tort, which addresses society’s interest in freedom from harm
when no bargained-for agreement exists.9
The Arizona Supreme Court first adopted the ELR in Salt River Project
Agricultural Improvement and Power District v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
which involved a strict product liability claim.10 The Salt River Project Court cited
Seely v. White Motor Co.11—also a products liability case—as the “genesis” of the
ELR.12 Seely established what has been recognized as a “per se” approach to the ELR,
which completely bars tort recovery for plaintiffs who suffered only economic loss
due to product defects.13
The Salt River Project court prescribed a more limited application of the
ELR, noting that “[u]nfortunately, few cases conform neatly to an ‘all or nothing’
configuration.”14 The Court therefore held that in order to determine “whether a
particular cause of action sounds in tort or contract, [the reviewing] court must
consider the facts of the case while bearing in mind that tort law is designed to
promote the safety of persons and property, whereas contract law is designed to
protect the parties’ expectations.”15 In deciding Salt River Project, the Arizona
Supreme Court listed three interrelated factors that trial courts should analyze in
determining whether a claim must be brought under tort or contract theories: (1) the
nature of the defect that caused the loss to the claimant; (2) the manner in which the
loss occurred; and (3) the type of loss for which the claimant seeks redress.16 If the
6

Carstens v. City of Phoenix, 75 P.3d 1081, 1083 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); see also Apollo
Grp. v. Avnet, Inc., 58 F.3d 477, 479 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying Arizona law).
7
Sw. Pet Prods., Inc. v. Koch Indus., 89 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1124 (D. Ariz. 2000) (applying
Arizona Law) (stating that the purpose of the economic loss rule is to “prevent parties from
undermining the certainty of contractual relationships by attempting to convert contract actions into tort
actions”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 32 F. App’x 213 (9th Cir. 2002).
8
E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 868, 866 (1986).
9
See Carstens, 75 P.3d at 1084.
10
Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 694
P.2d 198 (Ariz. 1984).
11
Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965).
12
694 P.2d at 209.
13
Seely, 403 P.2d at 151; see also Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Sam’s Plumbing, L.L.C., 207
P.3d 765, 769 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).
14
694 P.2d at 210.
15
Cook v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 258 P.3d 149, 152–53 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (citing
Salt River Project, 694 P.2d at 206).
16
694 P.2d at 210.
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factors weigh toward a claim based in contract, the ELR applies and the tort claims
are barred.17 Conversely, if the factors weigh toward a claim based in tort, the ELR
would not apply to preclude the asserted tort claims.18
After Salt River Project, the Arizona Supreme Court did not revisit the scope
of ELR until Flagstaff Affordable Housing.19 In the meantime (and despite the Salt
River Project court’s guidance), state and federal courts struggled to define the scope
of Arizona’s ELR. In Carstens v. City of Phoenix, Division One of the Arizona Court
of Appeals, extended the ELR to bar tort claims from a plaintiff in the construction
defect context who had no contractual relationship with the defendants whatsoever.20
The Carstens court relied on the Arizona Supreme Court case of Woodward v. Chirco
Construction Co., 21 which was decided before Salt River Project and did not itself
mention the ELR.22 Later, in Valley Forge Insurance Co. v. Sam’s Plumbing, Division
Two of the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected the Carstens court’s apparent adoption
of the per se rule established in Seely, noting that it was rejected by the Arizona
Supreme Court in Salt River Project.23
In Apollo Group, Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., the Ninth Circuit, applying Arizona law,
chose a broad application of the ELR—similar to that established in Seely—noting
that it read Salt River Project to construe the rule “broadly.”24 However, some
subsequent federal district courts that interpreted and applied the ELR from Salt River
Project expressed concern that certain federal courts had interpreted the rule too
broadly, and therefore in a manner inconsistent with Arizona state cases.25
As a consequence of the incongruous case law subsequent to Salt River
Project, the ELR—which originated in the context of products liability claims26—was
soon expansively applied by courts in general contract disputes27 to preclude tort

17

See Id.
Id.
19
Flagstaff Affordable Hous. Ltd. P’ship v. Design All., Inc., 223 P.3d 664, 666 (Ariz.
18

2010).
20

Carstens v. City of Phoenix, 75 P.3d 1081, 1085 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
Woodward v. Chirco Constr. Co., 687 P.2d 1269, 1269 (Ariz. 1984).
22
See generally Carstens, 75 P.3d at 1084–85.
23
Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Sam’s Plumbing, L.L.C., 207 P.3d 765, 769 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).
24
Apollo Grp., Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., 58 F.3d 477, 480 (9th Cir. 1995).
25
See, e.g., Evans v. Singer, 518 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1142–43 (D. Ariz. 2007) (questioning
the Apollo Grp. court’s broad reading of the ELR as explained in Salt River Project).
26
Cook v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 258 P.3d 149, 152–53 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (“The
Arizona Supreme Court first adopted the ELR in Salt River Project Agric. Improvement and Power
Dist. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 143 Ariz. 368, 694 P.2d 198 (1984), a case involving a claim for
strict product liability.”).
27
See Sw. Pet Prods., Inc. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 89 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1126 (D. Ariz. 2000)
(citing Apollo Grp., 58 F.3d at 480), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 32 F. App’x 213
(9th Cir. 2002).
21
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claims in cases involving life insurance purchases,28 the provision of services,29
software consultation agreements,30 and distributorship agreements.31
III.

FLAGSTAFF AFFORDABLE HOUSING LIMITED PARTNERSHIP V. DESIGN
ALLIANCE, INC.

Today, the leading ELR case in Arizona is Flagstaff Affordable Housing
Limited Partnership v. Design Alliance, Inc., which applied the ELR to claims based
on construction defects resulting from professional negligence. 32 The court in
Flagstaff Affordable Housing held “a plaintiff who contracts for construction
cannot recover in tort for purely economic loss, unless the contract otherwise
provides.”33 This holding “limited tort recovery involving ‘contracts for
construction’ to those situations in which the plaintiff’s economic loss was
‘accompanied by physical injury to persons or other property.’”34
Flagstaff Affordable Housing concerned an owner who contracted with an
architect to design eight apartment buildings as a low-income housing project.35
“[T]he U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development filed a complaint
against the owner for violation of accessibility guidelines.”36 The owner then sued
the architect, alleging negligence and breach of contract.37 The architect argued that
the ELR barred the owner’s negligence claims under the Arizona Court of Appeals,
Division One’s decision in Carstens.38
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the narrow scope of the ELR established in
Salt River Project, writing that whether the ELR applies may vary upon “contextspecific policy considerations” and “the underlying policies of tort and contract
law.”39 The Court expressly rejected Carstens for its mistaken reliance on
Woodward, which the Court did not read as endorsing the ELR at all.40
The Court then analyzed the contract law policy of upholding the parties’
expectations and found it particularly applicable in construction defect cases, where
the relevant contracts are often specifically negotiated for each project and have
See In re Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co. Premium Litig., 107 F. Supp. 2d 841, 861–62 (W.D.
Mich. 2000) (applying Arizona law).
29
See Carstens v. City of Phoenix, 75 P.3d 1081, 1083 , 1087 (precluding tort claims
against city building inspectors).
30
See Huron Tool & Eng’g Co. v. Precision Consulting Servs., Inc., 532 N.W.2d 541, 543
(Mich. Ct. App. 1995); see also Apollo Grp., 58 F.3d at 479 n.2, 481 (involving contract for
computer hardware and consultation).
31
Gen. Elec. Co v. Latin Am. Imps., S.A., 214 F. Supp. 2d 758, 764 (W.D. Ky. 2002).
32
Flagstaff Affordable Hous. Ltd. P’ship v. Design All., Inc., 223 P.3d 664, 665 (Ariz.
2010).
33
Id. at 670–71.
34
Shaw v. CTVT Motors, Inc., 300 P.3d 907, 909 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Flagstaff
Affordable Hous., 223 P.3d at 669–70 ).
35
Flagstaff Affordable Hous., 223 P.3d at 665.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 666. See generally Carstens, 75 P.3d 1081.
39
Flagstaff Affordable Hous., 223 P.3d at 669.
40
Id. at 668–69.
28

4
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detailed provisions allocating losses and remedies.41 In contrast, the policy
concerns of accident deterrence and loss-spreading did not warrant allowing tort
recovery in addition to contract remedies because the parties had already made
these contractual allocations.42
Additionally, the Court in Flagstaff Affordable Housing determined that, in
construction defect cases involving only pecuniary losses related to the building
that was the subject of the construction contract, there were “no strong policy
reasons to impose common law tort liability in addition to contractual remedies.”43
The Court held that, given these considerations “in construction defect cases, ‘the
policies of the law generally will be best served by leaving the parties to their
commercial remedies’ when a contracting party has incurred only ‘economic loss,
in the form of repair costs, diminished value, or lost profits.’”44
After concluding that the ELR applies in construction defect cases, the
Court went on to examine the homeowner’s argument that the ELR “should not
apply to professional negligence claims based on an architect’s design.”45 The
Court noted that, “[a]lthough architects have common-law duties of care, this case
illustrates that it is often difficult to draw bright lines between obligations imposed
by law and those arising from contract.”46 The Court held that “Architect’s duties
with regard to Owner’s project existed only because of the contract between the
parties[,]” explaining that “[a]rchitectural contracts generally include compliance
with applicable building codes and other legal design requirements as an implied
term.”47
The Court reasoned that “[a]ttempting to label claims by distinguishing
between contractual and extra-contractual duties is an unduly formalistic approach
to determining if plaintiffs like Owner should be limited to their contractual
remedies for economic loss.”48 The fact that architects owe legally imposed duties
of care as professionals, the Court explained, “does not displace the general policy
concerns that parties to construction-related contracts should structure their
relationships by prospectively allocating the risks of loss and identifying
remedies.”49
The Court stated that it did “not hold that the economic loss doctrine applies
to architects because they are professionals, but instead because the policy concerns
that justify applying the doctrine to construction defect cases do not justify
distinguishing” between contractors and architects in the construction defect
context.50
41

Id. at 669.
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 670 (quoting Salt River Project, 694 P.2d at 209).
45
Id. at 671.
46
Id. at 672.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 673.
42
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Thus, while Flagstaff Affordable Housing extended the ELR to construction
defect cases, the Court also affirmed its commitment to a narrow construction of
the ELR as established in Salt River Project, stating in summation that it did “not
suggest that the [ELR] should be applied with a broad brush in other
circumstances.”51
IV.

CONFLICTING ARIZONA CASE LAW POST-FLAGSTAFF AFFORDABLE
HOUSING

The Arizona Supreme Court’s holding in Flagstaff Affordable Housing has
been applied differently in state courts than in federal courts applying Arizona law.
State courts have been reluctant to examine whether the ELR applies outside of
products liability and construction defect cases, while federal courts have suggested
it should not apply to fiduciary duty claims.52
A. Arizona State Courts Applying Flagstaff Affordable Housing
Likely due to the Arizona Supreme Court’s guidance in Flagstaff Affordable
Housing that the ELR should not be applied broadly, Arizona state courts have been
reluctant to extend the ELR outside of the products liability and construction defect
contexts.53 But there are some outlier decisions that inject uncertainty into the state
of the ELR. Notably, Division One of the Arizona Court of Appeals in Cook v.
Orkin Exterminating Co., ostensibly relying on Flagstaff Affordable Housing,
applied the ELR to preclude claims for negligence, negligent and intentional
misrepresentation, and common law fraud. Cook involved a claim by homeowners
against a pest control company.54 The Cook court determined that upholding
contract expectations favored adherence to the remedies available under the parties’
contract, holding that a fraud claim was unavailable for defendant’s “alleged failure
to adequately perform its promises under the Agreement.”55 The court also
reaffirmed the importance of the policy justifications underlying the analysis of
whether the ELR applies, writing “[a]s in Flagstaff [Affordable Housing], the
contract law policy of upholding the parties’ expectations favor limiting
[plaintiffs’] claims to those in contract and, where there has been no injury besides
that to the subject property, there is no strong policy reason to impose tort
liability.”56
In the federal diversity context, Silverwood Real Estate Investments, L.L.C.
v. Wickman-Kush, which involved a dispute between investors in a proposed
51

Id. (citing Ellen M. Bublick, Economic Torts: Gains in Understanding Losses, 48 ARIZ.
L. REV. 693, 701 (2006) (noting that not all economic loss cases invoke the same interests or call
for the same treatment)).
52
B2B CFO Partners, L.L.C. v. Kaufman, F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1096 (D. Ariz. 2012) (citing
In re Gosnell Dev. Corp. of Ariz., 331 F. App’x. 440, 441 (9th Cir. 2009)); Id. (citing SCF Ariz. v.
Wachovia Bank, N.A., No. 09 Civ. 9513, 2010 WL 5422505, at *9-11 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2010)).
53
Id.
54
Cook v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 258 P.3d 149, 150-52. (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011).
55
Id. at 153.
56
Id.
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country club, might be relevant to fiduciary duty claims.57 There, plaintiff brought
claims for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, negligent misrepresentation, and fraud.58 The
breach of contract claim was dismissed before trial. 59 On appeal, the defendants
argued that the ELR precluded recovery under tort absent physical harm or
secondary property damage.60 The court in Silverwood Real Estate Invs., L.L.C.
noted: “We disagree with that application, particularly when the [trial] court found
there was no contractual relationship between Silverwood and the Kush Defendants
through which Silverwood could recover.”61
In support of its conclusion, the court noted: “The function of the economic
loss rule is ‘to encourage private ordering of economic relationships and to uphold
the expectations of the parties by limiting a plaintiff to contractual remedies for loss
of the benefit of the bargain.’”62 The court emphasized the direction provided by
the Arizona Supreme Court in Flagstaff Affordable Housing: “Rather than rely on
the economic loss doctrine to preclude tort claims by non-contracting parties, courts
should instead focus on whether the applicable substantive law allows liability in
the particular context.”63 The court in Silverwood Real Estate Invs., L.L.C.
subsequently held: “Because we find [the defendant] had a fiduciary duty to
Silverwood as a manager, and not arising from a contractual relationship, the
economic loss rule does not preclude recovery.”64 It is unclear how the court would
have applied the ELR had the fiduciary duty in question arisen from a contract.65
Unlike with breach of fiduciary duty claims, Arizona state courts have
addressed the applicability of the ELR to claims for professional negligence. Most
important of these cases is, as previously discussed, Flagstaff Affordable
Housing.66 The Arizona Court of Appeals has discussed the Flagstaff Affordable
Housing opinion’s discussion of professional negligence claims several times since
the decision was rendered—each time noting that the opinion stands for the
proposition that the ELR precludes claims for professional negligence in
construction defect cases.67

57

Silverwood Real Estate Invs., L.L.C. v. Wickman-Kush, No. 1 CA-CV 14-0822, 2016
Ariz. App. Unpub. WL 3944548, ¶¶ 2–10 (Ct. App. July 19, 2016).
58
Id. ¶ 5.
59
Id. ¶ 6.
60
Id. ¶ 21.
61
Id.
62
Id. (quoting Flagstaff Affordable Hous. Ltd. P’ship v. Design All., Inc., 223 P.3d 664,
671 (Ariz. 2010)).
63
Id. (quoting Flagstaff Affordable Hous., 223 P.3d at 671).
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Flagstaff Affordable Hous., 223 P.3d at 670–71 (Ariz. 2010).
67
See Maricopa Inv. Team, L.L.C. v. Johnson Valley Partners LP, 1 CA-CV 12-0047, ¶¶
7, 12 (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2012); Shaw v. CTVT Motors, Inc., 300 P.3d 907, 909 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2013).
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B. Federal Courts Applying Flagstaff Affordable Housing
Federal courts applying Arizona law have been more willing to shed light
on whether the ELR applies to fiduciary duty claims. The Arizona district court in
B2B CFO Partners, L.L.C. v. Kaufman held that the ELR did not preclude claims
for breach of fiduciary duty under Arizona law.68 In doing so, the court looked at
how federal courts outside of Arizona applying Arizona law had handled the issue.
Specifically, the court cited to In re Gosnell Development Corp. of Arizona, in
which:
[T]he Ninth Circuit briefly reviewed Arizona cases in which the
Arizona Court of Appeals “permitted a partner to recover (or at least
pursue) solely pecuniary damages from another partner that
breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the partnership, while acting
under an oral or written partnership agreement, with no mention of
the economic loss rule.”69
The court in In re Gosnell Development Corp. of Arizona subsequently found “‘no
basis for believing that the law of Arizona currently allows a broader application’
of the ELR such that it could be applied to cases that do not involve product liability
or construction defects.’”70
The Arizona district court in B2B CFO Partners, L.L.C. noted that the
Southern District of New York came to a similar conclusion in SCF Ariz. v.
Wachovia Bank, N.A.71 The court in SCF Ariz. “also declined to apply the economic
loss rule to the plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim.”72 “[T]he SCF Ariz. court
determined the Arizona Supreme Court’s reasoning in Flagstaff Affordable
Housing,73 ‘in which the court discussed the economic loss rule at length, “indicates
[the Arizona Supreme Court] would not extend the economic loss rule to breach of
fiduciary duty claims.”’”74 This conclusion, the court in SCF Arizona held, was
strongly supported by important public policy considerations. 75 Specifically, the
court in SCF Arizona stated: “where a contract places the parties in a relationship
in which the law then imposes certain duties recognized by public policy, the
gravamen of the subsequent action for breach is in tort, not contract.”76

68

B2B CFO Partners, L.L.C. v. Kaufman, 865 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1096 (D. Ariz. 2012).
Id. (quoting In re Gosnell Dev. Corp. of Ariz., 331 Fed. Appx. 440, 441 (9th Cir. 2009)).
70
L.L.C.Id. (quoting Gosnell, 331 Fed.Appx. at 441).
71
L.L.C.Id. (citing SCF Ariz. v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., No. 09 Civ. 9513(WHP), 2010 WL
5422505, *1, *9–11 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2010)).
72
L.L.C.Id.
73
Id. (quoting Flagstaff Affordable Hous. Ltd. P’ship v. Design All., Inc., 223 P.3d 664,
664 (Ariz. 2010)).
74
L.L.C.Id. at 1096 (quoting SCF Ariz., 2010 WL 5422505, *10) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2010)
(brackets original).
75
SCF Ariz., 2010 WL 5422505 at *11. (internal punctuation and citation omitted).
76
Id.
69
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The Arizona district court in B2B CFO Partners, L.L.C. found the reasoning
in the In re Gosnell Development Corp. of Arizona and SCF Arizona decisions
persuasive, and therefore held that the plaintiffs’ claim for breach of fiduciary duty
was not barred by the ELR.77 Given language in post-Flagstaff Affordable Housing
Arizona decisions, and the fact that the B2B CFO Partners, L.L.C., In re Gosnell
Development Corp. of Arizona, and SCF Arizona decisions all support the ELR not
precluding breach of fiduciary duty claims, it is unlikely that an argument that the
ELR bars breach of fiduciary duty claims will be successful.
ARIZONA’S ELR DOES NOT APPLY TO BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
CLAIMS

V.

Some may argue that the ELR precludes breach of fiduciary duty claims.
But the holding in Flagstaff Affordable Housing is narrow and must be viewed as
such in determining the current scope of Arizona’s ELR. In Flagstaff Affordable
Housing, the Arizona Supreme Court’s application of the ELR was limited to the
construction defect context—not construction cases generally. The Arizona
Supreme Court was explicit in this limitation:
We do not hold that the economic loss doctrine applies to architects
because they are professionals, but instead because the policy
concerns that justify applying the doctrine to construction defect
cases do not justify distinguishing between contractors on the one
hand and design professionals, including architects, on the other.
Our adoption of the economic loss doctrine in construction defect
cases reflects our assessment of the relevant policy concerns in that
context; it does not suggest that the doctrine should be applied with
a broad brush in other circumstances.78
But the Flagstaff Affordable Housing court did not adequately address the
agency relationship between the architect and the client, nor did it address situations
in which an architect owes a fiduciary duty to his or her client(s).79 Where there are
no construction defects in dispute, and the architect serves as the homeowner’s
agent or fiduciary to manage construction administration and other matters relating
to the construction, the ELR should not apply. The Arizona Supreme Court
acknowledged the material distinction in its decision: “[E]conomic loss doctrine

should not apply to claims against lawyers and fiduciaries because ‘[w]hen
you retain someone for the express purpose of being on your side, he cannot
77

B2B CFO PartnersL.L.C., 856 F. Supp. 2d at 1096.
Flagstaff Affordable Housing, 223 P.3d at 673 (Ariz. 2010) (emphasis added).
79
As leading commentators on the issue have stated, the impossibility of formulating a
single economic loss rule stems in part from the reality that the various contexts implicated by the
ELR invoke markedly difference policy concerns. Dan B. Dobbs, An Introduction to Non-Statutory
Economic Loss Claims, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 713, 733 (2006) (“It seems impossible to formulate a
single economic loss rule. Instead, the problem of recovery for pure economic loss that is
unaccompanied by physical harm to person or property occurs in a number of contexts that may
invoke differing concerns of policy.”).
78
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rightly contract to be your adversary instead or to be on your side but free to
be negligent.’”80
An argument that the ELR precludes a plaintiff’s tort claims simply by
virtue of defendant’s status as an architect with contractual privity is incorrect. The
ELR is “not a per se rule denying tort liability to all plaintiffs who suffer only
economic losses.”81 As the court in VFS Leasing Co. v. Silverado Stages Inc.
correctly held, “[T]here is little to support that the Arizona courts intended the
doctrine to apply outside [product liability and construction defect] contexts . . .
Indeed, a formulation of the economic loss rule that eliminates recovery under all
tort theories is ‘overly broad.’”82
The holding in Cook, supra, does not suggest a different conclusion. The
Division One of the Arizona Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s denial of
the Cooks’ fiduciary duty claim on its merits, not under the ELR.83 There was no
analysis of the fiduciary duty claim in relation to the ELR.
There is no reported decision by any Arizona court denying a fiduciary duty
claim on ELR grounds, and for good reason. The Arizona Supreme Court made
clear in Flagstaff Affordable Housing that fiduciary relationships fall outside the
scope of the ELR.84
The District Court of Arizona, which has addressed Arizona’s ELR in
several cases following Flagstaff Affordable Housing, has also explained that
Arizona courts do not apply the ELR to fiduciary duty claims. In B2B CFO
Partners, L.L.C. v. Kaufman, decided after Cook, the District Court described the
landscape in declining to extend the ELR to fiduciary duty claims under Arizona
law:
Arizona courts have typically limited the application of the rule to
product liability and construction defect cases. Defendant cites to no
cases in which an Arizona court has applied the economic loss rule
to a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, nor has Defendant offered
any compelling arguments for extending the rule to bar Plaintiffs’
claim for breach of fiduciary duty.85

80

Flagstaff Affordable Housing, 223 P.3d at 673 (citing Dobbs, supra note 79, at 727).
Jes Solar Co. v. Matinee Energy, Inc., 2015 WL 10943562 at *3 (D. Ariz. Nov. 2, 2015).
82
VFS Leasing Co. v. Silverado Stages Inc., 2019 WL 3841015 at * 2–3 (D. Ariz. Aug.
15, 2019) (citing Firetrace USA, L.L.C. v. Jeslcard, 800 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1052 (D. Ariz. 2010);
Flagstaff Affordable Housing, 223 P.3d at 667).
83
See Cook v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 258 P.3d 149, 151(Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (“The
Cooks Did Not State a Claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duty.”) (capitalization in original).
84
See Flagstaff Affordable Housing, 223 P.3d at 673.
85
B2B CFO Partners, L.L.C. v. Kaufman, 856 F. Supp. 1084, 1096 (D. Ariz. 2012) (citation
omitted).
81
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Though Arizona state courts are silent on the issue, federal courts outside
of Arizona have declined to extend the ELR to claims for breach of fiduciary duty
under Arizona law.86 In In re Gosnell Development Corp. of Arizona, the Ninth
Circuit briefly reviewed Arizona cases in which the Arizona Court of Appeals
“permitted a partner to recover (or at least pursue) solely pecuniary damages from
another partner that breached his or her fiduciary duty to the partnership, while
acting under an oral or written partnership agreement, with no mention of the
economic loss rule.”87 That court subsequently found “no basis for believing that
the law of Arizona currently allows a broader application” of the economic loss
rule, such that it could be applied to cases that do not involve product liability or
construction defects.88
Similarly, in SCF Arizona, the Southern District of New York also declined
to apply the ELR to the plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim.89 The SCF
Arizona court determined that the Arizona Supreme Court’s reasoning in Flagstaff
Affordable Housing “indicates [the Arizona Supreme Court] would not extend the
economic loss rule to breach of fiduciary duty claims.”90 SCF Arizona court further
noted that its conclusion was supported by policy considerations underpinning the
ELR. The court found persuasive the reasoning in In re Gosnell Development Corp.
of Arizona and SCF Arizona.
At bottom, the ELR does not preclude fiduciary duty claims under Arizona
law and there is no contrary authority at this time.91 For that reason, the Supreme
Court’s Decision in Flagstaff Affordable Housing should not be taken as a complete
bar to tort claims against architects.
VI. FLAGSTAFF AFFORDABLE HOUSING IS NOT A COMPLETE BAR TO TORT
CLAIMS AGAINST ARCHITECTS WITH CONTRACTUAL PRIVITY
Architects may contend that the ELR bars homeowners’ claims for
professional negligence against them. They would seemingly find support in
Flagstaff Affordable Housing, which applied the ELR to claims based on

In re Gosnell Dev. Corp. of Ariz., 331 F. App’x. at 441–42; cf. SCF Ariz. v. Wachovia
Bank, N.A., No. 09 Civ. 9513(WHP), 2010 WL 5422505, at *9–11 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2010)
(though Arizona courts are silent on the issue, courts outside of Arizona have declined to extend the
economic loss rule to claims for breach of fiduciary duty under Arizona law).
87
Id. at 441 (citations omitted).
88
Id.
89
SCF Ariz. v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., No. 09 Civ. 9513, 2010 WL 5422505, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2010)
90
Id. at *10 (“[W]here a contract places the parties in a relationship in which the law then
imposes certain duties recognized by public policy, the gravamen of the subsequent action for breach
is in tort, not contract.”) (internal punctuation and citation omitted).
91
Several state and federal courts outside Arizona have held the economic loss rule will
not preclude claims for breach of fiduciary duty. See In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Customer
Data Sec. Breach Litig., 2011 WL 1232352 at *18 n.7 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2011) (citing eight cases
from various jurisdictions that reject the application of the economic loss rule to breach of fiduciary
duty claims).
86
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construction defects.92 The Court in Flagstaff Affordable Housing held “a plaintiff
who contracts for construction cannot recover in tort for purely economic loss,
unless the contract otherwise provides.”93 In doing so, the Court “limited tort
recovery involving ‘contracts for construction’ to those situations in which the
plaintiff’s economic loss was ‘accompanied by physical injury to persons or other
property.’”94 Further, the fact that architects owe legally imposed duties of care as
professionals, the court reasoned, “does not displace the general policy concerns
that parties to construction-related contracts should structure their relationships by
prospectively allocating the risks of loss and identifying remedies.”95
But the fact that there is some overlap between contract and professional
liability should not preclude otherwise viable tort claims against architects. As the
district court noted in B2B CFO Partners, L.L.C. v. Kaufman, “where a contract
places the parties in a relationship in which the law then imposes certain duties
recognized by public policy, the gravamen of the subsequent action for breach is in
tort, not contract.”96
Many architect agreements explicitly acknowledge the coexistence of
contractual and professional responsibility, including the American Institute of
Architects’s (“AIA”) oft-used AIA B101-2007 form contract, which provides: “The
Architect shall perform its services with the professional skill and care ordinarily
provided by architects practicing in the same or similar locality under the same of
similar circumstances.”97 The AIA’s published commentary for the AIA B1012007 form contract explains the rationale behind its incorporation of this language:
Generally speaking, like all professionals, an architect must perform
its duties consistent with the degree of care and competence
generally expected of a reasonably skilled member of the profession.
This standard of care applies in any professional activity an
architect undertakes, regardless of whether or not the standard of
care is stated in the contract for services. . . . Additionally, the
definition is sufficiently flexible to adapt to each state’s particular
standard of care. It is the AIA’s intent that B101-2007 will provide
the owner with a better understanding of the common law standard
of care for an architect. Practically speaking, however, the inclusion
of this standard of care provision in the contract will have
essentially no impact on the nature of the architect’s services, as

92

Flagstaff Affordable Hous. Ltd. P’ship v. Design All., Inc., 223 P.3d 664, 665 (Ariz.

2010).
93

Id. at 670–71.
Shaw v. CTVT Motors, Inc., 300 P.3d 907, 909-10 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting
Flagstaff Affordable Housing, 223 P.3d at 670–71).
95
Flagstaff Affordable Housing, 223 P.3d at 672.
96
B2B CFO Partners, L.L.C. v. Kaufman, 856 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1096 (D. Ariz. 2012).
97
THE AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA, B101-2007 STANDARD FORM OF AGREEMENT
BETWEEN OWNER AND CONTRACTOR § 2.2 (2007).
94
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those services have always been subject to a common law standard
of care definition similar to that set forth in B101.98
This guidance suggests the question of whether a plaintiff’s claim against
an architect for professional negligence sounds in tort or contract after Flagstaff
Affordable Housing is in many cases a legal fiction. Indeed, the Arizona Supreme
Court in Flagstaff Affordable Housing expressly approved of its earlier decision in
Donnelly Construction Co. v. Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland,99 which held that a lack of
privity between a contractor and an architect did not bar claims for professional
negligence.100 The Flagstaff Affordable Housing court also recognized that the
professional standard of care for architects is often an “implied term” in their
contracts.101 Therefore, after Flagstaff Affordable Housing, when a homeowner
contracts with an architect and the ELR applies, a reviewing court would
presumably apply the same standard of care that it would apply to tort claims
against an architect by a plaintiff who lacks contractual privity, only the claim
would technically sound in contract rather than tort.
But Flagstaff Affordable Housing did not adequately address a situation in
the architectural context where the parties are in a legal relationship in which the
law imposes, even absent a contract, certain duties recognized by public policy. As
the court in B2B CFO Partners, L.L.C. v. Kaufman noted, “where a contract places
the parties in a relationship in which the law then imposes certain duties recognized
by public policy, the gravamen of the subsequent action for breach is in tort, not
contract.”102 Examples of duties that may qualify for exemption from application
of the ELR include professional duties of care that exist even absent a professional
contract, which give rise to an action for breach in tort—not contract—and
therefore fall outside the purview of the ELR.
Consider the following hypothetical: Plaintiff retains Architect not only to
design her luxury custom home, but to serve as a fiduciary, Owner’s representative,
and agent to oversee and manage construction phase services—relatively common
responsibilities for architects.103 In this role, Architect recommends Contractor—a
98

THE AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA, COMMENTARY: B101TM-2007 3 (2007) (emphasis

added).
99

Donnelly Const. Co. v. Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland, 677 P.2d 1292, 1295–97 (Ariz. 2010).
Flagstaff Affordable Housing, 223 P.3d at 671 (“Without discussing the [ELR],
Donnelly correctly implied that it would not apply to negligence claims by a plaintiff who has no
contractual relationship with the defendant.”).
101
Id. at 672.
102
B2B CFO Partners, L.L.C. v. Kaufman, 856 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1096 (D. Ariz. 2012)
(quoting SCF Ariz. v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., No. 09 Civ. 9513, 2010 WL 5422505, at *11 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 14, 2010)) (internal punctuation and citation omitted).
103
See, e.g., Dawn Zuber, Six Services Architects Provide on Residential Projects, AM.
INST. OF ARCHITECTS, https://www.topicarchitecture.com/articles/74756-six-services-architectsprovide-on-residenti (last visited July 24, 2020) (stating “your architect observes the pace and
quality of construction. As your agent, your architect looks out for your interests, keeping you
informed of the project’s progress and overseeing any changes or problems that may arise.
Construction phase services are helpful in keeping your project on track and within budget.”).
100
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lucrative business partner of Architect’s—for the construction project and
encourages Plaintiff to enter into a cost-plus contract with Contractor without
characterizing it as such. Contractor begins to charge Plaintiff with ambiguous,
unsupported fees for phantom “self-performed work,” with no oversight by
Architect.
Plaintiff alerts Architect when she becomes aware of the charges, but
Architect abandons its duty to protect Plaintiff’s interests in favor of its reliance on
its friend and business partner, Contractor. When the issue of Contractor’s
overcharges comes to a head and litigation is being contemplated, Architect claims
to be a neutral party unable to assist with resolution of the dispute. As a result of
Architect’s actions, and lack thereof, Plaintiff suffers damage beyond the scope of
her contract in the form of significant overcharges.
In this situation, Architect should be estopped from denying his role as
fiduciary, Owner’s representative, and agent. Clearly, this hypothetical situation is
distinguishable from disputes regarding contracts addressing a common service
relationship with the Orkin man to spray for termites (Cook) or Fair Housing Actcompliant apartment designs (Flagstaff Affordable Housing). The crux of the
hypothetical dispute is Architect abandoning his role as Plaintiff’s agent in
administering construction phase services and as fiduciary in looking out for, and
acting to protect, the homeowner(s)’s best interests under a special relationship of
trust and confidence.104 Architect thought his abandonment of his construction
phase responsibilities was acceptable because he trusted Contractor.
But as agent and fiduciary of Plaintiff, Architect did not have the luxury of
sitting back and trusting that Contractor would do aspects of Architect’s job to
protect Plaintiff’s interests for him. In failing to act as the necessary check on
Contractor’s nefarious actions, Architect violated his readily accepted professional
and fiduciary duties, causing significant damage. Further, by Architect claiming to
be a neutral party when Plaintiff’s claims against Contractor came to light,
Architect acted in direct contravention of his admitted agency role. Architect’s
actions and failures to act contravene the duties it owed to Plaintiff and led to
Plaintiff suffering damage well beyond the scope of the architectural contract. A
situation of the above type, which regularly happens in the luxury home
construction space, 105 therefore creates liability separate and apart from the contract
under duties created under the law.
104

See, e.g., Sky Harbor Hotel Props., L.L.C. v. Patel Props., L.L.C., 443 P.3d 21, 23 (Ariz.
2019) (“[A]n agent is a fiduciary with respect to matters within the scope of his agency. . . . [and]
the nature of the fiduciary relationship for agents includes a duty of loyalty, a duty of good faith,
and a duty of care.”) (internal citations omitted); Barmat v. John and Jane Doe Partners A-D, 747
P.2d 1218, 1222 (Ariz. 1987) (“As a matter of public policy, attorneys, accountants and other
professionals owe special duties to their clients, and breaches of those duties are generally
recognized as torts.”).
105
Mary Van Keuren, How to Prevent Construction Fraud, COVERAGE (July 8, 2020),
https://www.coverage.com/insurance/home/ways-to-spot-construction-fraud/ (last visited July 27,
2020) (“According to the Better Business Bureau (BBB), residential contractor fraud is the
number one complaint by homeowners.”).
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This conclusion is supported by the refusal of federal courts applying
Arizona law to apply the ELR to usurp fiduciary and agency principles. Therefore,
where an architect is entrusted with the responsibility to serve as the homeowner’s
fiduciary to safeguard his or her best interests and freely accepts this role, Arizona
courts should not allow architects to use the ELR as a sword to preclude otherwise
independently viable tort claims. As the Arizona Supreme Court acknowledged in
Flagstaff Affordable Housing, the ELR should not be interpreted to preclude claims
against those who are hired as fiduciaries and agents.106 When you hire someone as
your fiduciary and agent, “he cannot . . . be on your side but free to be negligent.”107
Moreover, contract and negligence claims are not mutually exclusive under
Arizona law.108 “As a matter of public policy, attorneys, accountants and other
professionals owe special duties to their clients, and breaches of those duties are
generally recognized as torts.”109 In Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal
Underwriters Insurance Co., the court explained that “[t]he principle involved” in
professional negligence claims “is simply that a person who holds himself out to
the public as possessing special knowledge, skill or expertise must perform his
activities according to the standard of his profession. If he does not, he may be held
liable under ordinary tort principles of negligence for the damage he causes by his
failure to adhere to the standard.”110
Arizona courts have applied this principle to professionals other than
lawyers and doctors, including engineers111 and contractors.112 In a factual situation
where a defendant holds himself out to the plaintiff(s) as having special knowledge,
skill, or expertise with regard to a certain trade, the defendant should be held to the
applicable professional standard of care. As the courts in B2B CFO Partners, L.L.C.
and SCF Arizona urged, when a contract, such as a professional services agreement,
“places the parties in a relationship in which the law then imposes certain duties
recognized by public policy [such as a fiduciary relationship or where a
professional duty of care is owed], the gravamen of the subsequent action for breach
is in tort, not contract.”113 As such, the hypothetical plaintiffs would have a viable
cause of action for professional negligence against the hypothetical defendant(s).

106

Flagstaff Affordable Housing, 223 P.3d at 673.
Id.
108
See Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
694 P.2d 198, 209-10 (Ariz. 1984) (“Each case must be examined to determine whether the facts
preponderate in favor of the application of tort law or commercial law exclusively or a combination
of the two.”).
109
Barmat, 747 P.2d at 1222.
110
Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 388, 403 (Ariz.
1984).
111
Joseph Painting Co. v. Larson Eng’g, Inc., Case No. 1 CA-CV 09-0327, 2010 WL
746173, at *2–4 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2010).
112
Hunter Contracting Co. v. Superior Court, 947 P.2d 892, 894–95 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).
113
B2B CFO Partners v. Kaufman,L.L.C. 856 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1096 (D. Ariz. 2012)
(“[W]here a contract places the parties in a relationship in which the law then imposes certain duties
recognized by public policy, the gravamen of the subsequent action for breach is in tort, not
107
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In sum, an architect’s professional duties do not exist “but for” the actual
architect agreement, and Arizona courts should not hold otherwise despite the
Arizona Supreme Court’s unclear statements in Flagstaff Affordable Housing.
Rather, these professional duties arise from common law and should not be
superseded by an architect agreement. Arizona courts and federal courts applying
Arizona law should reject attempts to preclude professional negligence claims
based on an application of the ELR.
VII.

CONCLUSION

When it first adopted the ELR in Salt River Project, the Arizona Supreme
Court explicitly rejected the per se approach to the ELR and instead charted a course
towards narrow, context-specific application of the rule. The Arizona Supreme Court
expressly affirmed this narrow view in Flagstaff Affordable Housing yet cast
unnecessary ambiguity on the professional duty architects owe to their clients and how
a contractual relationship might affect this duty. At the same time, the Court
recognized that the ELR should not be taken to preclude fiduciary duty claims, and
federal courts applying Arizona law have held as such post-Flagstaff Affordable
Housing. For the same reasons that the ELR should not apply to fiduciary duty claims,
the ELR should not preclude viable tort claims against architects, regardless of
whether they have contractual privity with the plaintiff, because they themselves owe
similar duties recognized at common law.
Arizona courts should continue in their narrow application of the ELR,
especially in situations where parties owe legal duties which go beyond the fourcorners of a contract.

contract.”) (quoting SCF Ariz. v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., No. 09 Civ. 9513, 2010 WL 5422505, at
*11 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2010) (internal punctuation and citation omitted).
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